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Article 8

The Moral Position of Landowners
Within the Scope of CERCLA
Hundreds of years from now, when history students are
looking into the past of America, it might appear that the United States government woke up one morning to discover that its
country was on the verge of becoming a vast wasteland. Viewing the great mass of hazardous waste problems throughout
the country, Congress hastily enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA). 1 Part and parcel to CERCLA was the creation of
the Superfund. 2 The idea was that if a problem were too great,
and threatened the public health and well being, then no time
should be wasted. The government would stop the problem and
clean it up, spending the monies of the Superfund. Mterwards,
the government would seek out those responsible to take on the
economic burden of the clean-up.
Congress left great gaps in CERCLA which were left for
the courts to fill. In 1986, Congress amended CERCLA by codifying much of what the courts had done in gap-filling with the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986
(SARA). 3 SARA amends, clarifies, and reauthorizes the original CERCLA statute while replenishing and increasing the
Superfund.
Under CERCLA, liability is assigned to all potentially
responsible parties (PRPs). 4 Landowners who are potentially
liable find that the exceptions to CERCLA are few and that the
price of liability is great. Therefore, landowners have sought
vigorously to come within the narrow defenses allowed under
CERCLA. As a result, the defenses possible under CERCLA
have become quite distinct through the refining fire of litiga-

1.
As amended 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
2.
The Superfund is simply a cash reserve which the USEPA may use to
clean up hazardous waste sites which endanger the public. Congress intended
initially that the Superfund would entail $ 1.5 billion and last five years. As of
this writing, estimated costs that the actual clean ups which will be required
under CERCLA using the Superfund will range between $ 750 billion and $ 1 trillion, and take 30 years to clean up, if as much contamination exists as some fear.
Milton Russel, Wasteful Waste Disposal?, WASH. Posr, Mar. 20, 1992, at A25.
3.
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
4.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4) (1988).
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tion and appellate review.
For landowners, there is the possibility of showing that
they fit into the "innocent landowner" exception. 5 The landowner can also try to escape liability by contracting with the
lessee for full and total indemnification. Both of these possibilities carry great risk because they are asserted after the cleanup when the government is seeking indemnification. If the
landowner loses, he may liable for a large damage award. A
back door is open to the landowner in that he may attempt to
settle with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for a
relatively small amount in a de minimis settlement.
However, all of these possibilities can be cut off if the court
finds the slightest degree of fault by commission or omission on
the part of the landowner. 6 Although CERCLA is recognized as
a strict liability statute, courts continue to look to equitable
factors of fault when they actually apportion liability in contribution actions. 7 Even if the landowner was not actually producing any of the waste, however, the picture can still appear
ominous, considering that courts in many cases are declaring
the parties as jointly and severally liable regardless of relative
causation. 8
Landowners have reason for concern because courts have
been scrupulously examining the landowner's position in defining when a landowner may be held liable. In a recent case,
United States v. R. W. Meyer, Inc., 9 the Sixth Circuit affirmed a
district court decision which found liability based on the moral
position of the landowner. The moral position standard, simply
stated, is that a landowner has an inherently higher moral
duty to society to remain informed of all activities which are
conducted on his land. The presumed better ability of landowners to monitor potential problems makes them better able to
circumvent potential hazardous waste problems.
This paper will explore the impact and implications of this
decision by examining the moral position standard under

5.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1988), discussed in further detail infra.
6.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(6) (1988) (a bar against liability exists only where a PRP
can show that the damages caused by the release or threat of release "were caused
solely by" one of the enumerated defenses). ld.
7.
42 U.S.C. § 9613(1)(1) (1988).
See, e.g., United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 932 F.2d 568 (6th Cir. 1991);
8.
United States v. Monsato Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988); Mardan Corp. v.
C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986).
9.
932 F.2d 568 (6th Cir. 1991).
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CERCLA as it applies to landowners. The facts and decision of
Meyer will be used in Part I as a backdrop for comparing and
analysing the application of this standard. Part II will examine
the general purpose and struicture of CERCLA as well as the
tools available to the EPA to implement it. Part III will discuss
whether the moral position standard achieves the purposes of
CERCLA, what impact this will have on landowners, and how
exposure to liability can be reduced.
!.

UNITED STATES V.

R. W. MEYER

Procedurally, the appeal in Meyer arose at the latest stage
possible. The clean-up had already occurred and the court had
identified the PRPs. The party who had assumed the burden of
"fronting" the costs of the remedial action was pursuing all
PRPs to get contribution.

A. Facts of United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc.

R.W. Meyer (Meyer) owned property in Cadillac, Michigan,
and, like any reasonable landowner, wished to make some
money from his investment. In 1972, Meyer entered into a 10year lease with Northernaire Plating Company (Northernaire)
to operate a metal electroplating business on Meyer's property.
Willard S. Garwood was the president and sole shareholder of
Northernaire and managed the day-to-day operations of the
company. In mid-1981 all the assets of Northernaire were sold
to Toplocker Enterprises, Inc. (Toplocker). 10
In March of 1983, officials from the Michigan Department
of Natural Resources and the federal EPA examined the property. It had been reported that a child had received burns while
playing on the property. When the soil, sludge, and drums
containing a vast array of materials on the property were tested, substantial amounts of caustic and corrosive materials were
found. 11 Specifically, the EPA noted that they observed cyanide filled drums and tanks haphazardly strewn about the
property outside the facility. 12 Officials also determined that
Nothernaire discharged materials into a catch basin where it
leaked into the local sewage system. 13

10.
11.
12.
13.

ld. at 569.
ld. at 570.
ld.
ld.
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Although the facts of this case are frightening, they are, in
actuality, no worse than many of the environmental problems
which can be found en masse throughout the country. 14 Since
the problem at the facility was continuing and threatened public welfare, the EPA conducted an "Immediate Removal Action."15 Mter taking this remedial action and cleaning up the
site, the United States commenced an action to recover the
costs of clean-up paid out of the Superfund.
The district court found the harm indivisible, and therefore, found all the defendants jointly and severally liable. 16
Alof the defendants then brought cross-claims for contribution
against each other, which claims were all granted summary
judgment. 17 The summary judgment rulings are at issue as
they involved the final allocation of costs. Interestingly, in the
allocation of costs, the trial court assigned two-thirds of the
total clean-up costs to Northernaire and its principal shareholder Garwood, but assigned an entire one-third portion, or
$114,274.41 to the landowner. 18 The assignment of this share
was the focus of the Sixth Circuit's opinion, and this comment
will focus on this allocation as well.

B. Analysis of the Court in Meyer
The trial court founded its apportionment of contribution
on several frequently cited factors: 19
(1) the ability of the parties to demonstrate that their contribution to a discharge release or disposal of a hazardous waste
can be distinguished;
(2) the amount of the hazardous waste involved;
(3) the degree of toxicity of the hazardous waste involved;
(4) the degree of involvement by the parties in the generation,

14.
There are presently approximately 1,200 "priority sites" throughout the
United States with problems similar to those in Meyer. Robert Harris, Hazardous
Wastes, Superfund and Toxic Substances, C667 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 55 (1991).
15.
!d. at 569.
16.
See United States v. Northernaire Plating Co., 670 F. Supp. 742 (W.D.
Mich. 1987). Liability was founded on Section 107(a) of CERCLA (42 U.S.C. §
9607(a)).
!d.
17.
18.
Meyer had "generously" offered to pay the EPA $1,709.03. 932 F.2d at 571.
In some cases such an amount would likely be appropriate as a de minimis settlement. See infra text accompanying note 88.
19.
Northernaire, 670 F. Supp. at 742. As this paper is focusing on the contribution issues, the exact grounds for finding Meyer generally liable are not
discussed.
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transportation, treatment, storage, or disposal of the hazardous waste;
(5) the degree of care exercised by the parties with respect to
the hazardous waste concerned, taking into account the characteristics of such hazardous waste; and
(6) the degree of cooperation by the parties with Federal,
State, or local officials to prevent any harm to the public
health or the environment. 20

While recognizing that the lessee was the primary contributor,
the court nonetheless apportioned to the lessor, Meyer, one
third of the liability. This was based primarily on two factors:
first, the court found that Meyer had not done his utmost in
cooperating with the EPA and state officials, and second, the
court did not believe that Meyer, as the owner of the site, had
exercised an acceptable degree of care as the landowner with
respect to the hazardous waste. In addition, Meyer had allegedly constructed the sewer line on the property negligently. 21
The court further found, that in light of the amount of hazardous waste released and the extreme toxicity of the waste involved, the regulations and standards of CERCLA should be
strictly applied. 22
The section of SARA which illuminates contribution actions, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(£)(1) (1988) states: "In resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate response costs among
liable parties using such equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate." The trial court also announced that it
took into consideration Meyer's moral contribution as the owner of the site. 23 Meyer had attempted to elude liability by arguing that he could not be shown to have caused any of the
harm, except perhaps as to the existence of the sewer line. 24
Meyer maintained that his contribution to the release of hazardous materials was negligible. 25 But the court's adoption of
a moral position standard, which the Sixth Circuit affirmed,

20.

See 932 F.2d at 571 citing Amoco Oil Co. v. Dingwell, 690 F. Supp. 78, 86

(D.Me. 1988), affd sub nom. Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Dingwell, 884 F.2d 629
(1st Cir. 1989); United States v. A & F Materials Co., Inc., 578 F. Supp. 1249
(S.D.III. 1984); H.R. REP. No. 253(III), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, (1985), reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 3038, 3042.
21.
Meyer, 932 F.2d at 571.
22.
ld. at 571-74.
23.
ld. at 573.
24.
ld.
25.
ld.
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completely rejected any such arguments. An analysis of the
general aims of CERCLA is necessary in order to understand
the import of the moral position standard.

II.

STRUCTURE OF

CERCLA

Uncontrolled toxic dumps and storage of hazardous materials constitute a major threat to millions of people throughout
the United States. 26 Congress stated that CERCLA was enacted in 1980 to confront, "[t]he legacy of past haphazard disposal
or chemical wastes and the continuing danger of spills or other
releases of dangerous chemicals."27 In order to further protect
public health and safety and to preserve the environment, Congress promulgated CERCLA and SARA. 28 The provisions of
the 1980 CERCLA statute make up the nucleus of the federal
response to difficulties connected with cleaning up contaminated lands.
The 1986 SARA amendments clarify and reauthorize
CERCLA. 29 Recognizing that time is the most critical element
in a hazardous waste clean-up, Congress sought out measures
which would allow the government to clean up the problem
now and ask questions later. 30 Specifically, Congress wanted
to give the EPA a strong oversight role with "tough legal enforcement standards."31
A.

Tools Available to the EPA under CERCLA

CERCLA effectively gave the Executive branch of the government, or the agency administering the statute, the Environmental Protection Agency, the tools necessary to fulfill this
mission. CERCLA authorizes the President to take any action
he "deems necessary to protect the public health or welfare or

26.
See infra note 2.
27.
SENATE COMM. ON ENV'T AND PuB. WORKS, ENVIRONMENTAL EMERGENCY
RESPONSE ACT, S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1980), reprinted in 1
Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act of 1980 at 477 (1983).
28.
Ascon v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1989).
29.
Thus the SARA amendments have become one within CERCLA, and this
comment will be referring to the whole statutory scheme simply as CERCLA.
30.
SARA "has been written with the underlying belief that Congress should
focus on ways to ensure rapid and thorough cleanup of abandoned hazardous
wastes . . . ." H.R. REP. No. 253(1), 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 3,55 (1985), reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2837.
31.
ld.
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the environment."32 The President is instructed to seek out
both known and threatened releases of hazardous pollutants,
substances, or contaminants. 33 Congress created a fund which
the President, through the EPA could draw on to clean up the
wastes. 34 Thus, the Superfund was created to combat problems which the EPA found to pose a serious risk to either the
public or the environment. 35
The Superfund money will be completely allocated to this
clean up response unless the EPA can find a solvent liable
party. 36 When the EPA can find a responsible party, then the
government must seek an injunction or issue an administrative
order to force the responsible parties to pay for the costs. 37
When the hazardous waste problem is seen as an imminent
danger, for example, when the waste continues to seep through
the ground or flow into a public sewer, then the EPA simply
cleans up the mess and then goes hunting for PRPs. 38 There
are two actions available to the EPA are two: (1) short-term
"removal" actions/9 and (2) long-term "remedial" efforts. 40
Section 9607(a) of CERCLA places liability for the clean-up
on four different groups: (1) individuals who owned the property at the time the taxies were released, (2) individuals who accept hazardous waste for transportation, disposal, or treatment,
(3) individuals who arranged for disposal of hazardous substances by contract or otherwise, and (4) the current landowners.41 For the purposes of administrative ease and reduction of

32.
42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1988).
33.
42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1)(A)-(B) (1988).
34.
See generally 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1988).
35.
ld.
36.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).
37.
ld. Congress could plainly see that it could not finance the entire clean-up
of America, and hence, anytime the money can be recovered, it must be sought.
See Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 714 F. Supp. 1439, 1445 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
38.
See, e.g., Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986);
New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1043-44 (2d Cir. 1985).
39.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (1988) (i.e., cleaning up spilled substances before they
have contaminated the entire area, or building an impoundment wall).
40.
ld. § 9601(24) (i.e., relocation of displaced residents, dredging, repairing
leaking containers).
41.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) states in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to
the defense set forth in subsection (b) of this section(1) the owner and operator of . . . a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were
disposed of,
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litigation costs, the EPA often seeks to recover these costs only
from the current landowner. 42

B.

Strict Liability under CERCLA

Although the Superfund exists to finance the clean up of
hazardous wastes, courts construing CERCLA often impose
strict liability upon all responsible parties so that all the monies expended from the Superfund can be recouped. 43 CERCLA
does not contain express language demanding the imposition of
strict liability. However, the Second Circuit in New York v.
Shore Realty Corp. 44 stated that CERCLA section 9607(a)(l)
"unequivocally imposes strict liability on the current owner of a
facility from which there is a release or threat of release, without regard to causation."45 Therefore, the simple ownership of
land can, in some instances, be the key to the allocation of
large portions of liability.
Such an allocation follows Congress' intent. The legislative
history shows that Congress established a strict liability standard under CERCLA based on its conclusion that anyone who
engages in any activity connected with hazardous substances is
involved in an abnormally dangerous activity. 46 Negligence,
causation, and fairness are not elements of responsibility under
CERCLA. As already stated, since the current owner is easily
found and often solvent, the EPA frequently seeks a recovery of
the Superfund allocations from him.

C.

Joint I Several Liability under CERCLA
Responsible parties are regularly held jointly and severally

(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for
disposal or treatment . . . of hazardous substances owned or possessed by
such person, by any other party or entity . . . and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for
transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites
selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened
release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of hazardous substance, shall be liable for [all costs incurred].
42.
See, e.g., Sand Springs Home v. Interplastic Corp., 670 F. Supp. 913 (N.D.
Okla. 1987).
43.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) ("[PRPs] shall be liable for (A) all costs of removal
or remedial action incurred by the United States . . . .").
44.
759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
ld. at 1044.
45.
46.
See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) (1988); S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
13,33-34 (1980) (Hazardous substance is a term which is defined by the USEPA)"
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liable since it is difficult to prove that the harm is divisible. 47
Often materials combine to create new hazardous substances so
that any tracing is impractical if not impossible. ''The practical
effect of placing the burden on defendants has been that responsible parties rarely escape joint and several liability .... "48 Some courts have felt that the time consuming task
of tracing waste to allocate liability would ignore Congress'
concern that the clean-up efforts proceed quickly. 49 These
courts have held that differentiation of substantial versus trivial causation should not be used in CERCLA litigation. 5° For
this reason, even landowners who have only remote contact
with their lands can potentially be held completely responsible
for the entire clean-up costs. In the initial allocation of liability,
there is no place for comparative causation.

D. Defenses to CERCLA Liability
CERCLA section 9607(a), which assigns liability, specifically states that it is subject only to the defenses defined in
subsection (b) of section 9607. 51 The enumerated defenses are:
(1) an act of God, (2) an act of war, and (3) the "innocent landowner" defense. 52 The innocent landowner defense states in
pertinent part:
[There is no liability where the defendant can establish that
the release was caused by] an act or omission of a third party
other than an employee or agent of the defendant, or than one
whose act or omission occurs in connection with a contractual
relationship, existing directly or indirectly, with the defendant ... if the defendant establishes by a preponderance of
the evidence that (a) he exercised due care with respect to the
hazardous substance concerned, taking into consideration the
characteristics of such hazardous substance, in light of all
relevant facts and circumstances, and (b) he took precautions
against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party
and the consequences that could foreseeably result from such

47.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). See Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1042 n.l3. See also
United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171-73 (4th Cir. 1988); United States
v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 809-11 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
48.
O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 178 (1st Cir. 1989).
49.
!d. at 179 n.4.
50.
!d.
51.
See supra note 30.
52.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1988).
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acts or omissions .... 53

Section 9607(b)(3) must be read with section 9601(35) if the
owner has taken title subsequent to the release. 54
The innocent landowner defense is the most commonly
invoked defense, 55 and to successfully raise the defense the
defendant must prove all the elements of section 9607(b)(3).
Such a standard is hard for any landowner to prove, and as
will be shown, the moral position which the Sixth Circuit announced potentially makes asserting this defense even harder.
The landowner may be held liable for the acts of his tenants. 56 Courts have also considered the tenants to be "owners"
under CERCLA. 57 These same courts have concluded that
both the tenant and the landowner together are to be considered owners under CERCLA section 9607(a). The landowner
cannot invoke the innocent landowner defense unless he can
show that he undertook "all appropriate inquiry into the previous ownership and uses of property consistent with good commercial or customary practice."58 What constitutes appropriate
inquiry is a question of fact which must now be interpreted in
light of the moral position standard.

E.

Contribution Actions Under CERCLA

Often it is the current landowner who is sought out for
contribution by the EPA. But any party, such as a possessory
tenant, who is found liable can spread the liability among all
PRPs through a contribution action.

53.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1988).
Under § 9601(35) the buyer must still show that he had no knowledge of
54.
the hazardous substance and he must also show that he used due diligence in
attempting to make sure that there was no hazardous substance on the property.
See Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986).
Claims of act of God and act of war are rarely successful as they are hard
55.
to prove. For either defense, the defendant would have to show that it contributed
in no way to the cause of the problem. As the simple storage of materials or the
leasing to one who stores hazardous materials can be seen as a causative connection, especially under the moral position standard, these defenses are useless to
most landowners.
See United States v. Argent Corp., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,616
56.
(D.N.M. May 4, 1984); United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc.,
653 F. Supp. 984 (D.S.C. 1984).
57.
South Carolina Recycling, 653 F. Supp. at 1003.
United States v. Serafini, 711 F. Supp. 197, 198 (M.D. Pa. 1988). See also
58.
42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(B)(West Supp. 1989).
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Any person may seek contribution from any other person who
is liable or potentially liable under section 9607(a) of this
title, during or following any civil action under section 9606 of
this title or under section 9607(a) of this title. Such claims
shall be brought in accordance with this section and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and shall be governed by Federal law. In resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate response costs among liable parties using such equitable
factors as the court determines are appropriate. Nothing in
this subsection shall diminish the right of any person to bring
an action for contribution in the absence of a civil action under section 9606 of this title or section 9607 of this title. 59
This section was added through the SARA amendments. Prior
to the SARA Amendments, the federal courts applied an equitable analysis and come to the same conclusions. 60 Section
9613(f) is, therefore, simply a codification of the federal common law which developed prior to the SARA amendments both
in applying joint and several liability and allowing contributions against other liable parties. 61
For landowners, or anyone caught up in a contribution
action, a threshold question becomes what factors the court will
consider as appropriate equitable factors. The House Judiciary
Committee, which drafted language similar to section 9613(f),
explained that a court could consider anything it felt relevant
and enumerated the following possible considerations:
[T]he amount of hazardous substances involved;the degree of
toxicity or hazard of the materialsinvolved; the degree of
involvement by parties in the generation, transportation,
treatment, storage, or disposal of the substances; the degree
of care exercised by the parties with respect to the substances
involved; the degree of cooperation of the parties with government officials to prevent any harm to public health or the
en viron ment. 62
A court is not substantially limited in what it may consider
because its determinations and conclusions have their basis in
equity. Years ago the Supreme Court announced that: "The

59.
42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1) (1988) (emphasis added).
60.
United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
61.
ld.
62.
H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 3,55 (1985) reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3042.
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essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do equity and to mould each decree to the necessities
of the particular case. Flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished it."63 In CERCLA litigation, the public interests in
having the Superfund replenished, guarding the public health,
and providing an effective deterrent are seen as central to any
apportionment decisions. "The hallmark of a court of equity is
its ability to frame its decree to effect a balancing of all the
equities and to protect the interests of all affected by it, including the public."64
The legislative history of section 9613(0 exhibits Congress'
intent that a court adjudicating a contribution action should
evaluate moral as well as legal considerations in the apportionment. This is because the statute requires the court to not look
exclusively to traditional equitable factors, but instead to "such
equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate."65
The latitude given under the statute is, therefore, extremely
broad because the court's determination regarding equitable
factors can only be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.66 Since the lists of factors provided by the legislature
and the cases interpreting the statute are only guidelines, the
cited factors for apportionment are in no way exhaustive. As in
the traditional application of equity, the court will look closely
at the facts of each case.
In a restitutionary approach to contribution some courts
have looked at the benefits received by the parties as well as
the knowledge or acquiescence of the parties in the contaminating activities when apportioning liability. 67 In this regard,
landowners can receive larger apportionments based on the
knowledge, whether actual or constructive, of the nature of
their tenant's business. The collection of rent, therefore, carries
with it the obligation, in the eyes of some courts, to become
knowledgeable concerning the actions of a tenant who possesses the land in question.
In prior adjudications of contribution actions under section

63.
Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944)(citations omitted).
Kay v. Mills, 490 F. Supp. 844, 855 (E.D.Ky. 1980) (citing W. DeFuniak,
64.
HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQUITY 25 (1956)).
65.
42 u.s.c. § 9613(0(1) (1988).
66.
Loudermill v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 844 F.2d 304, 308 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 946 (1988).
67.
South Florida Water Management Dist. v. Montalvo, No. 88-8038, 1989 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 17555 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 15, 1989).
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9613(f) have shown that the courts are generally most concerned with achieving the purposes of CERCLA and replenishing the Superfund. Therefore, a court in its consideration of
equitable factors might "consider the state of mind of the parties, their economic status, any contracts between them bearing
on the subject, and any traditional equitable factors deemed appropriate as mitigating factors .... "68 The expandable nature
of this provision was intended by the legislature. As the legislative history of section 9613(£) states, "contribution claims will
be resolved pursuant to Federal common law."69
As the court in Meyer stated, traditional defenses in equity
will only be seen as mitigating factors. Such traditional defenses as unclean hands, laches, caveat emptor, waiver, unjust enrichment, and estoppel have no place in CERCLA liability allocation. 7° Courts are especially adverse to allowing defendants
in contribution actions to escape liability under such equitable
defenses since spreading the costs of a clean up will more likely
replenish the Superfund. 71
For instance, courts have elaborated as to why the doctrine
of unclean hands is an inapplicable bar to a contribution action.
First, the statutory language itself sets no limit as to who
among the PRPs may be brought into a contribution action.
Section 9613(£) authorizes "any party" to recover response costs
from "any other person who is liable." Second, since contribution actions apply to PRPs, all the parties involved have unclean hands by definition, and to allow a party to assert the
equitable defense of unclean hands would emasculate section
9613(£). The relative "cleanliness" of the parties' hands can
have an effect on the determination made by the court, but
there can be no bar to recovery based on this equitable defense.
Many of the other equitable defenses have not been litigated, but there is no reason to believe that a court would allow
them as a bar to recovery in any instance. A contribution action
simply signifies that the EPA chose one or two PRPs, usually

68.
United States v. Meyer, Inc., 932 F.2d 568, 572-73 (6th Cir. 1991).
69.
H.R. REP. No. 253(I) (Energy & Commerce Committee), 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. 80 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2862; see also H.R. REP. No.
253(III) (Judiciary Committee), 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1985), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3038, 3042.
70.
Southland Corp. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 994, 1002 (D.N.J. 1988)
(equitable defenses apply to damages only as mitigating factors).
71.
Invoking the statute of limitations against a contribution action is viable as
it is provided for in CERCLA itself. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g) (1988).

356

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 6

those with the deepest pockets, to initially clean up the site.
This leaves the splitting of hairs to contributions actions. Such
a formulation meets the needs of CERCLA in that the often
slow process of apportionment takes place after the threat to
the public has been obviated.
The language of CERCLA's contribution section "reveals
Congress' concern that the relative culpability of each responsible party be considered in determining the proportionate
share of cost each must bear." Numerous courts have applied a
scheme of applied comparative negligence principles within the
strict liability structure of CERCLA. The legislative history
exhibits that Congress intended the contribution section to
"encourage quicker, more equitable settlements, decrease litigation and thus facilitate cleanups." While the threat of contribution may in fact facilitate settlement and private clean-up actions, it will probably not cut down on litigation at all. Since
the amounts of liability in most CERCLA actions are so great,
settlement is often impossible with parties who are attempting
to elude all liability. Therefore, litigation in many cases will
only be increased.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts recognizes two approaches to apportionment: ( 1) pro rata, and (2) comparative
contribution.
Under the pro rata method shares are divided
up equally. This would present a windfall for large corporations
since large shares could be assumed by small entities or individuals with few assets who actually contributed little to the
problem. Therefore, courts generally do not apportion contribution on the pro rata basis. Courts have noted that pro rata
apportionment would not fulfill Congress' intent that apportionment be fair.
Under the comparative causation scheme courts consider
such factors as knowledge, amount of risk created by the conduct, degree of negligence, and overall circumstances. Causation is compared while not being the basis of liability, as
CERCLA is a strict liability statute. The causation only determines what share the parties will bear.
A modification of the pro rata and comparative causation
schemes may be found in the proposed Gore Amendment to
CERCLA. While the House of Representatives passed the
amendment, it failed to pass the Senate and was subsequently
dropped from CERCLA. The Gore Amendment would apportion
liability with an eye to the furtherance of the goals of
CERCLA. This amendment directed the court to look at the
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volume and toxicity of the release as they relate to culpability.
In United States v. R. W. Meyer, one finds that the district
court used all of the methods mentioned above. The court compared causation in the sense of the Gore Amendment, but at
the same time finally ended with a purely pro rata share. As
stated, Congress was concerned that parties who actually
caused little of the release would bear burdens too great under
the strict liability standard and the contribution scheme. However, the district court in Meyer supplies the reader with the
basis as to why the outcome is fair and the final apportionment
fully fulfills the goals of CERCLA. The district court achieves
this through the recognition of the moral position of PRPs.
III.

A.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE MORAL POSITION STANDARD

The Moral Position of Contributors Under CERCLA

The district court in Meyer stated that its decision to apportion one-third of the total clean-up costs was based on the
fact that Meyer did not cooperate with the EPA and that Meyer
had a causative connection to the release since he had constructed the sewer through which the wastes were released. 72
Additionally, the court stated that Meyer had a significant
responsibility "simply by virtue of being the landowner.'>73It is
mainly this conclusion which Meyer disputed on appeal.
The Sixth Circuit stated likewise: "[T]he trial court quite
properly considered here not only the appellant's [Meyer's]
contribution to the toxic slough described above in a technical
causative sense, but also its moral contribution as the owner of
the site."74 The court reasoned that meticulous findings of
causation were not warranted nor intended by Congress under
CERCLA. Instead, the primary factors that a court should be
concerned with are that the clean-up costs will be borne by
those who are responsible, and that the public interest can be
protected. 75 The moral contribution or position standard
achieves this purpose by first assigning the costs to persons
who, like Meyer, could have done something about the hazardous substance release. The facts show that Meyer knew exactly
what was going on. Second, in order to protect the public, the
courts should adopt the moral position standard as a warning
72.
73.

74.
75.

United States v. Meyer, Inc., 932 F.2d 568, 571 (1991).
ld.
Meyer, 932 F.2d at 573.
ld.
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to future landowners.
Through the adoption of this standard, landowners will be
less passive about watching questionable activities occur on
their land, and they will understand that they may be liable for
any environmental problems which may occur. They will make
it their business to know what is taking place on their land. If
an environmental catastrophe is averted through such a strict
standard, then the objectives of CERCLA will have been
achieved.
The scope of CERCLA liability serves to encourage private
remedial initiative as to existing sites, to discourage careless
disposition of toxic wastes, and not least to ensure the vigilance of those whose proximity to generators of toxic substances creates the potential for liability, who also occupy the
most advantageous positions from which to monitor [generators].76

The moral position standard is not completely new to
CERCLA litigation; it is an extension of an emerging trend.
When a landlord leases land to a tenant, both the landlord and
the tenant are liable as possessors and owners of a "facility"
under CERCLA. 77 Courts have held that the landlord is liable
even if the tenant is shown to be the sole cause of the release. 78 The knowledge or consent of the landlord is irrelevant. 79 One might reason that the landlord should have
known about circumstances which would lead to CERCLA liability.
A corollary of the moral position standard is found in the
already well settled area of contribution from landowners who
purchased the land after the release. To avoid liability, purchasers must show that they did not know and had no reason
to know that the property was contaminated. 80 A landowner
who owned the land before the release should be expected to
adhere to at least the same standard, if not a higher one.

76.
AM Int'l, Inc. v. International Forging Equip., 743 F. Supp. 525, 527 (N.D.
Ohio 1990) (emphasis added).
77.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal,
Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984, 1003 (D.S.C. 1984). See note 32 supra at 11.
78.
United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 168-69 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Argent Corp., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,616 (D.N.M. May
4, 1984).
!d.
79.
80.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)(i) (1988).
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In United States v. Monsanto Co., 81 the landowners verbally leased their property on a month-to-month basis. It was
the lessor's understanding that the party to whom he leased
the land would be using it for storing of raw materials and
finished products. Later, the lessee began using the land as a
facility for the disposal and storage of chemical wastes generated by third parties. 82 The landowners were unaware of this
activity for several years. 83 Eventually, an environmental
problem surfaced which required a remedial action by the government. The landowners were held jointly and severally liable
for the $1.8 million in clean-up costs. 84
The moral position standard simply demands a more narrow reading of the innocent landowner's defense as well as
extending more responsibility to those who have owned property for the entire period in question. The moral position
should be compared with the provision that the landowner
exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance,
and that he took precautions against the third party's foreseeable acts. 85 The due care that the landowner should be expected to exercise should include occasional personal observations
of what occurs on his property. The landowner should also be
imputed to have had the common sense to know that when a
product is manufactured wastes are produced. The landowner,
therefore, should be inquisitive as to what those wastes are
and if he might be potentially liable in the future.
Thus, through tightening the innocent landowner defense
with the imposition of a moral position standard, PRPs will not
stick their heads in the sand and hope for the best. Instead,
they will be proactive in ensuring that their liability exposure
is reduced. Some landowners may find through diligent effort
that a release has already occurred, and while they might not
be able to escape all liability, a landowner can at least minimize his total liability.
B.

Reduction of Liability Exposure

The landowners must accept the fact that the moral position standard is a sign of an emerging trend acknowledging the

81.

858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988).

82.

!d. at 164.
!d.
!d.
See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (198R).

83.
84.

85.
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inherent responsibility that landowners possess. The acceptance of this responsibility, coupled with the recognition that
landowners are often the PRP the EPA first seeks out for compensation, should prompt landowners to attempt to limit their
liability. Exposure to liability can be reduced through attempting to contract out of the liability, seeking de minimis settlements, and cooperating with the EPA.

1. Limitations on Contracting Out of CERCLA Liability
The court in Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C Music, Ltd., recognized that parties can allocate environmental liability between
themselves by contract. 86 The court stated:
Contractual arrangements apportioning CERCLA liabilities
between private "responsible parties" are essentially tangential to the enforcement of CERCLA's liability provisions. Such
agreements cannot alter or excuse the underlying liability,
but can only change ultimately who pays that liability. Moreover, regardless of how or under what law these agreements
are interpreted, the result cannot prejudice the right of the
government to recover cleanup or closure costs from any responsible party .... 87

The Ninth Circuit's holding reflects CERCLA section
9607(e)(l), 88 and has great import for the landowner as he is
often the defendant of choice for the government and may have
to front the clean-up costs until he can complete an action for
contribution under CERCLA.
A defense against a contribution action based on a contrac-

86.
804 F.2d 1454, 1458 (9th Cir. 1986) ("[A] uniform federal rule should not be
developed to govern the issue of whether and when agreements between private
'responsible parties' can settle disputes over contribution rights under section 107
[§ 9607]."). !d.
87.
!d. at 1459. Accord Smith Land & Improv. Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d
86, 89 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029 (1988); Channel Master Satellite
Sys., Inc. v. JFD Elecs. Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1229, 1231 (E.D.N.C. 1988).
88.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(1) states:
No indemnification, hold harmless, or similar agreement or conveyance
shall be effective to transfer from the owner or operator of any vessel or
facility or from any person who may be liable for a release or threat of
release under this section, to any other person the liability imposed under
this section. Nothing in this subsection shall bar any agreement to insure,
hold harmless, or indemnify a party to such agreement for any liability
under this section.
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tual agreement will only be upheld if the parties' intent to
preclude assertion of statutory rights is clear and unambiguous.89 The applicable law, however, will be the state law applicable to the contract at issue. Therefore, effectively contracting
allocation of potential liabilities varies depending on jurisdiction.
Contractual agreements which can be construed narrowly
will not preclude CERCLA liability where it is not clearly the
intent of the parties. 90 In Southland Corp. v. Ashland Oil,
Inc., 91 an express indemnity clause limited all liability for two
years. While holding that parties can contract out of CERCLA
liability, the court held that the clause in this case did not
preclude liability under CERCLA because the clause was not
specific enough as to environmentalliability. 92
Thus, landowners who attempt to allocate CERCLA liability in contracts, such as leases, should be specific in their allocation. In view of the fact that the government may sue them
first, landowners should consider the possibility that the indemnity clause will do them no good if the party with whom
they contracted is insolvent or non-existent when the hazardous situation is discovered. Therefore, landowners should be
prepared to limit their liabilities in other ways.

2. De Minimis Settlements for PRP Landowners
Congress acknowledged that some PRPs would be unfairly
burdened if they were forced to assume large portions of liability under CERCLA's strict liability scheme. Pursuant to
section 122(g)(l) of SARA, 93 individuals may qualify as de minimis waste contributors. The EPA is given authority to enter
into negotiations with de minimis contributors in an attempt to
reach an equitable settlement.
In the typical de minimis settlement, the settling parties, in
exchange for a payment, will receive statutory contribution
protection under section 122(g)(5)94 of SARA and may be
granted a covenant not to sue where such a covenant is con-

89.
Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1461.
90.
Channel Master Satellite Sys., 702 F. Supp. at 1231 (E.D.N.C. 1988) (indemnification clause did not apply to violations of federal law).
91.
696 F. Supp. 994 (D.N.J. 1988).
92.
ld. at 1002.
93.
Codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(l) (1988).
94.
42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(5) (1988).
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sistent with the public interest under section 122(g)(2). 95

For those landowners who find themselves liable, but who
can show that they have fulfilled many of the requirements
that they would need to assert a valid innocent landowner
defense, a de minimis settlement often is the best avenue for
limiting liability. As the first party which the EPA will sue to
pay for a remedial action, many legal costs can be saved by
entering into negotiations with the EPA. Refusing to make a de
minimis settlement also opens the landowner up for large
amounts of liability. If the interest of the landowner is to minimize liability exposure, then a de minimis settlement is almost
always the best alternative.

3. Cooperation with the EPA Essential to Liability
Minimization
"PRPs who have been unresponsive to information requests
or subpoenas generally should not be considered for de minimis
settlements."96 It is never in the interest of a landowner to be
uncooperative with the EPA. First, such behavior can obliterate
any chances of entering into a de minimis settlement. Second,
among the list of factors courts look at when apportioning liability in a contribution action is "the degree of cooperation by
the parties with Federal, State, or local officials to prevent any
harm to the public health or the environment."97 It can only
hurt the landowner if he is uncooperative.
Thus, through either contracting out ofliability, or seeking
a de minimis settlement, exposure to massive liability can be
reduced. At a minimum, cooperation with the EPA is essential.
There are, of course, no guarantees that any efforts to reduce
exposure will help lessen liability in a strict liability scheme
considering the harm has already been adjudicated as joint and
several.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Through the imposition of the moral position standard in
analyzing potential landowner liability, courts like the Sixth
Circuit in Meyer recognize the great influence landowners can
95.
24,334
96.
97.

Superfund Program: De Minimis Contributor Settlements, 52 Fed. Reg.
(1987).
ld. at n.2.
See supra note 20.
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have over environmental waste problems. The moral position
evaluation lies well within the court's equitable powers and
allows the court to achieve the goals intended by Congress in
CERCLA. If landowners recognize the high standard to which
they must conform, then they can act accordingly in preventing
harm to the environment. At the same time, by being conscious
of their obligation to the public to guard against the release of
hazardous substances, landowners can limit their own liability
exposure under CERCLA.

David N. Mortensen

